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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of mathematics in the Palestinian 
economy by deriving a dynamic model for the speed –the rate of change – of the expansion for the 
Israeli settlements and thus the “swallowing” rate of Palestinian lands. Partial Differential 
Equations were used to derive a theoretical model for the “swallowing” rate of Palestinian lands 
by Israeli settlements, which in turn result in tremendous negative effects on both the agricultural 
and industrial sector of the Palestinian economy. The developed dynamic model explains the 
process of which the Israeli settlements expands and the variables affecting the “swallowing” rate. 
The data was plotted and a mathematical equation was fitted for the growth rate of the settlements. 
This will give the policymakers an approximation of how fast the settlements are expanding and 
may aid them in their strategic planning of Palestinian development. 
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1. Introduction  
Since one of the most threatening challenges 
facing the existence of the Palestinian people 
is the expansion of the Israeli settlements, 
this is due to the continuous increase in the 
number of Israeli settlements living in the 
West Bank. The purpose of this paper is to 
develop a dynamic model that estimates the 
speed – the rate of change – of the expansion 
of Israeli settlements. This paper 
demonstrates the importance of mathematics 
in the Palestinian economy through the 
derivation of a dynamic model that is causing 
the “swallowing” of Palestinian lands. This is 
a crucial issue as the spread of the Israeli 
settlements are an indication to the end of the 
Palestinian dream in having an independent 
Palestinian state. This paper will aid in 
creating a theoretical framework in 
understanding the process by which the 
settlements are expanding. More 
mathematical literature should be geared 
towards this issue. 
The Israeli settlements are a major part of the 
Israeli occupation, where the restrictions that 
are imposed by the Israeli authorities – in 
order to secure the settlements – are used as a 
tool to have political, geographical, and 
economical control over the Palestinian 
resources. By doing so, the Israeli occupation 
is transformed from a military occupation to 
colonization and thus removing the 
Palestinians from their homes. From the first 
day, the occupation had the intension of 
controlling the natural resources of the 
nation.  This is achieved by spreading its 
settlements in East Jerusalem, the Jordan 
Valley, and north of the Dead Sea as part of a 
plan in order to control the water resources, 
mining resources, and tourist sites. The 
Israeli strategy had been to increase the 
number of settlements and expand those 
existing. The Israeli authorities had also 
worked on creating a network of roads that 
connect settlements together and with the 
other side of the Green Line. In addition, the 
Israeli implemented a strategy of building 
industrial sites in the West Bank that serve 
the settlements, encouraging tourism in the 
settlements, and building institutions in the 
settlements that serve both the settlers and 
Israeli citizens outside of the West Bank. All 
this has been done on the expense of 
Palestinian lands. 
The various economic indicators demonstrate 
the burden that the settlements have on the 
Israeli economy. In addition to all that, the 
settlements contribute to the change of 
demographics for the advantage of the 
Israelis in the West Bank (Atrash, 2014). The 
settlements affect negatively the following 
Palestinian economic sectors: 
1. The agricultural sector is affected 
directly from the existence of the 
settlements, where the amount of land 
that can be used by Palestinians for 
agriculture is continuously 
decreasing. In addition, the total 
control of the water resources by the 
Israelis in the Palestinian territories 
due to the existence of the settlements 
affects the agricultural sector 
negatively. 
2. The manufacturing sector is limited 
by the expansion of the settlements, 
where the settlements are occupying 
lands that can be used to build 
industrial zones. In addition, 
THE ROLE OF MATHEMATICS IN THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY: ESTIMATING THE SPEED OF THE 
SWALLOWING OF PALESTINIAN LANDS BY THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS                          43                              
SBE, Vol.22, No.1, 2019 
ISSN 1818-1228     ©Copyright 2019/College of Business and                                        
Economics, Qatar University 
 
settlements are built in locations that 
are strategic for manufacturing sites. 
For example, settlements are built 
along the Green Line. If the 
manufacturing site is built there, it 
will be closer to both Israeli and 
Palestinian markets. It will also be 
closer to seaports.  
3. The increase in the number of settlers 
in the West Bank is colonizing more 
land that is affecting the expansion of 
the Palestinian cities. Thus, strategic 
planners have to constantly re-
organize the patterns of expansion of 
Palestinian cities. In addition, it is 
driving the price of land in the 
Palestinian territories to rise. Thus 
making it more expensive for 
Palestinians to own or rent property. 
(Atrash, 2014) Table 1 shows the number of 
settlers living in the Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank including Jerusalem by region. 
Table 1: Number of Settlers in the West Bank Settlements by Year and Region, 
1986-2016 
Year West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) Jerusalem West Bank
1986 60766   
1987 67483   
1988 73403 117550 190953 
1989 79842 123061 202885 
1990 88888 132460 221348 
1991 100729 137331 238060 
1992 111673 140872 252545 
1993 122320 146436 268756 
1994 133572 152219 285791 
1995 140235 156724 296959 
1996 153974 159684 313658 
1997 167124 158929 326053 
1998 179087 162842 341929 
1999 190750 170400 361150 
2000 205113 173986 379099 
2001 215062 175987 391049 
2002 226712 178437 405149 
2003 240313 181425 421738 
2004 252737 184944 437681 
2005 265049 187573 452622 
2006 279479 190534 470013 
2007 294133 193485 487618 
2008 298961 197071 496032 
2009 314101 196803 510904 
2010 328774 200545 529319 
2011 343350 205088 548438 
2012 359571 205746 565317 
2013 373995 209912 583907 
2014 387949 214362 602311 
2015 400988 218297 619285 
2016 414127 222325 636452 
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Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
 
 
Graph 1: Increase in the Number of Settlers over Time 
 
The graph and table above show a continuous 
increase in the number of Israeli settlers over 
time. In 1988, the total number of settlers was 
190,953 were 117,550 settled in Jerusalem 
and 73,403 settled in the rest of the West 
Bank. In 1994, the Palestinian Authority took 
control of Jericho; the total number of settlers 
was 285,791 with 152,219 in Jerusalem and 
133,572 in the rest of the West Bank. Thus, 
the number of settlers increased by 
approximately 29 percent in Jerusalem and 
approximately 82 percent in the rest of the 
West Bank since 1988. Meanwhile, in 2016 
the total number of settlers reached 636,452 
with 222,325 in Jerusalem and 414,127 in the 
rest of the West Bank. Thus, the number of 
settlers increased by approximately 43 
percent in Jerusalem and approximately 210 
percent in the rest of the West Bank since the 
year 1994. Clearly, time is not a constraint to 
the Israeli government; on the contrary, it is 
to their benefit. This shows the true 
intensions of the Israeli government towards 
giving up the West Bank despite of the 
signing of the Oslo Agreement with the 
Palestinians. The above data asserts that the 
Israeli government invested sufficiently in 
time to change the demographics on the 
ground to their advantage in the West Bank 
and create a new reality. Therefore, the 
settlements are a major obstacle to the two 
state solutions. 
The monotonically increasing function 
shown in the graph clearly reflects the 
continuous increase in the number of Israeli 
settlers. Nonetheless, in this paper we are 
interested in the time and space dimension.  
The above table does not show the amount of 
land occupied by the Israeli settlers. 
However, the continuous increase in the 
number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank 
causes an increase in the demand for housing 
and associated services –such as schools, 
medical centers, shopping centers, 
universities, etc. - in the settlements. This 
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continuous increase results in an upward 
pressure on the price of land in the 
settlements and adds extra pressures to 
expand the borders of the settlement. This 
will have further implications in our analysis 
in creating the theoretical framework for 
estimating the amount of “swallowing” of 
Palestinian lands.  
Let us take a closer look at some spatial facts 
concerning the settlements. The total area of 
the West Bank is 5664.5 km2 including East 
Jerusalem, where the settlements occupy 
2.7% of the total area of the West Bank. In 
addition, the settlements have an “area of 
jurisdiction” that is larger compared to the 
settlement built up area within the fence. The 
area of jurisdiction of settlements exceeds 
9.3% of the area of the West Bank. Moreover, 
the settlements are connected with a well-
developed road network that takes 2.3% of 
area to connect settlements together and 
connect them to their center of life in Israeli 
(Samara, 2019).  
The table in Annex I shows the number of 
settlers living in each of the settlements, the 
initial area occupied by the settlement when 
it was first established, and the area of each 
settlement in 2016. 
Table 2 shows only the settlements not 
including the illegal outposts. The table 
indicates that the largest settlement in terms 
of number of settlers is Modi’ih Ilit with 
66,847 and the smallest is Niran with 91. 
Nonetheless, these two settlements are not 
the largest and smallest in terms of area. The 
largest settlement in terms of area is Bet Arye 
with 7814 m2 and the smallest is Rotem with 
55 m2. From looking at the table above, we 
also notice that most of the settlements were 
established in the eighties.  
2. Literature Review 
In the 1970s, a new generation of 
mathematical urban theories manifested.  
These theories formed the new urban 
economics. This approach was successful in 
explaining certain economic and 
geographical phenomena in urban systems. 
In addition, it was also able to explain the 
behavior of households and firms in urban 
systems. Nonetheless, the problem was that 
most of the models in this approach required 
perfect competition. So, an assumption was 
made that both households and firms had 
perfect information about housing and land 
markets (Mills & Mackinnon, 1973). 
In reality, urban development processes are 
dominated by imperfect information and 
disequilibrium. Thus, relaxing the 
assumption of perfect competition leads us to 
urban development models of geographical 
diffusion. These models describe dynamic 
urban development pattern formations by 
PDEs in which temporal and spatial 
economic development processes can be 
dealt with simultaneously. These models are 
aimed at trying to explain how urban patterns 
might be far away from the equilibrium 
determined by the new urban economics 
(Zhang, 1988).  
Zhang (1988) developed a dynamic model 
for urbanization in the regional system 
containing the Central Business District, the 
urban, and the rural areas. The paper had 
described “eating up” of rural areas by the 
expanding the organization.  Partial 
differential equations were used to represent 
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the spatial and temporal land prices of the 
urban and rural areas. It’s also asserted the 
movement of the boundary of the urban 
areas. Three differential equations were used 
to demonstrate the movement of the 
boundary, and the deviation from the 
equilibrium due to the inflationary forces. It 
was concluded by construction of analytic 
solution for the fixed rural land price. 
Kaashoek and Paelinck (1994) potentialized 
the spatial variables to generalize the partial 
differential equation in order to be used in 
spatial economics.  This process was carried 
out for one dimensional wave equation.  
Linear, exponential, and tanner potentials 
were investigated. The result of the analysis 
had led to the utilization of the exponential 
equation in producing meaningful analytical 
solutions for spatial economic patterns. This 
paper has also discussed the problems of 
stability and strangeness of the dynamical 
solutions.   
Kaashoek and Paelinck (2001) used 
potentialized wave and diffusion equations to 
emphasis the relationship between the 
resulting process and potentializing 
parameters. Empirical relevance to spatial 
economics was mentioned and discussed. 
Redding and Rossi –Hansberg (2017) 
described what was achieved as a result of the 
utilization of quantitative models in spatial 
economic in this decade.  
Marquez, Lasarte, and Lufin (2019) proposed 
a measurement for the procedure for the role 
of geographical position in economic 
inequality. In addition, they aimed to 
determine an approach for the decomposition 
of global inequality into both within and 
between countries components in order to 
assess which of these components is a result 
of neighborhood factors.  This was applied to 
European countries. Based on the inequality 
analysis certain policies were recommended.   
Vallone (2019) used geo-computation in 
spatial economic analysis. He constructed 
and applied a new set of algorithms and 
functions in the R programming language to 
deal with spatial economic data. 
Portilla, Maza, and Villaverde (2019) 
examined the effects of inward FDI on 
economic growth –focusing on the 
headquarters effect- across the Spanish 
regions over the time period of 1996 to 2013.  
The paper had concluded that FDI does not 
always register where it is effectively made, 
but instead in the region in which the firm’s 
headquarters is located. This is achieved by 
estimating a panel spatial spillovers results: 
FDI does foster economic growth, only when 
the headquarters effect is properly addressing 
the question do spatial spillovers arise. 
The above literature had asserted how 
spatial economics had developed over time. 
Now let us consider how mathematics was 
used in the Palestinian economy. 
Paul de Boer and Marco Messaglia (2006) 
utilized mathematics and statistics to estimate 
the income elasticities and their use in a CGE 
model for Palestine. They used the Linear 
Expenditure Systems (LES) to estimate the 
consumption block for the computable 
general equilibrium model (CGE). To 
represent reality – where non-straight Engel 
curves, inferior commodities, elastic demand, 
and gross substitution exist – the use of the 
Indirect Addilog System (IAS) was 
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suggested. Thus, the income elasticities of 
the IAS were estimated from the 1998 
Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption 
Survey (PECS). Calculating the income 
elasticities using the IAS model helped in 
trying to explain the consumption behavior. 
Samarah (2016) studied the relationship 
between Gross Disposable Income (GDI) and 
consumption, and the consumption function 
for Palestine was estimated. Three 
econometric models were constructed to 
estimate the consumption function and 
calculus was used to derive the Marginal 
Propensity to Consume (MPC) in both the 
short and long run.   
The key determinants of poverty status a 
household since the implementation of the 
economic reform program in Palestine were 
also identified using mathematical and 
statistical techniques. Through the utilization 
of the Logistic Regression Model it was 
found that the chance of a household to fall 
into poverty increases due to the unemployed 
adults, the large number of children below 18 
years old, and the large dependency ratio 
(Elnamourty & Safi, 2012).  
Mathematics was also able to analyze the 
impact of the size of domestic working labor 
force, Real Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation, real domestic exports and imports 
of goods and services, as well as political 
instability on the Real Gross Domestic 
Product (RGDP) in Palestine. The Cobb-
Douglas function was used to formulize the 
functional relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the RGDP. The 
study had indicated the urgent need for 
increasing the level of investment into the 
Palestinian economy (Abu-Eideh, 2014).  
Samarah (2018) had proved that there is a 
functional relationship between governance 
and economic growth in Palestine using real 
analysis.  Thus, economic growth is a 
function of governance. 
This paper will use partial differential 
equations to derive a dynamic model to better 
understand the rate of change in which the 
Israeli settlements are expanding in the West 
Bank. Thus, this paper will add a more 
regress and theoretical approach to the 
already limited existing literature. 
3. Spatial Economics  
In recent years, Partial Differential Equations 
(PDEs) had played an important role in 
economics.  An example is the large literature 
on the design of optimal dynamic contracts 
and policies (Farhi & Werning, 2013). Labor 
economics, was another area in which PDEs 
were used in modeling the labor markets 
(Alvarez & Shimer, 2011) and reviewed by 
(Lentz & Mortensen, 2010).   
A system of nonlinear PDEs was also used to 
model heterogeneous agents sharing a 
common mathematical structure over time. 
Thus, PDEs were able to present a continuous 
time formulation of the simplest model to 
study the effect of various policies and 
institutions on the inequality of income and 
wealth distributions (Achdou, Lasry, Lions, 
& Moll, 2014).   
To understand the growth rate of the Israeli 
settlements, we will discuss how spatial 
economics based on a single space dimension 
x and time t can model reality. PDEs had long 
represented space-time dimensions. Thus, we 
will use PDEs to model the expansion 
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patterns of the Israeli settlements. Let us look 
at some examples of how PDEs can be used 
in spatial economics to describe the pattern of 
evolution of cities over space-time 
dimension. 
Considering only one space variable x and 
time t, a PDE for some function f(x,t) is a 
relation of the form: 
݃ሺݔ, ݐ; ݂; 	 ௫݂, ௧݂ ; ௫݂௫, ௫݂௧, ௧݂௧; …) = 0 
In the above equation g –in general- is a 
given function of both the independent 
variables x and t; of the unknown function f; 
and a finite number of its partial derivatives.  
Nonetheless, in order to apply PDE to human 
spatial behavior we need two fundamental 
adoptions.  The first is that the interaction at 
a distance should be taken into consideration 
explicitly. Thus, Potentialzed Partial 
Differential Equations (PPDE) is considered.  
Thus, applying to the classical PDE the idea 
of “potential function”. The second adaption 
is the interpretations of PPDE in the presence 
of a bifurcation parameters relating to the 
openness of the spaces studied (Kaashoek & 
Paelinck, 2001, p. 464). A parameter is a 
numerical or other measurable factor forming 
on of a set that defines a system or sets the 
conditions of its operations. A Bifurcation 
parameter is most commonly used in the 
mathematical study of dynamic systems. A 
bifurcation occurs when a small smooth 
change made to the parameter values (the 
bifurcation parameters) of a system causes a 
sudden quantitative or topological change in 
its behavior. 
Let us now consider the classical wave 
equation 
݂ሷ(x,t) ൌ	ߙଶ݂ᇱᇱሺݔ, ݐሻ  
This equation is an expression of local 
interaction. However, in spatial economics 
locality is rather the exception. Thus, in order 
to express the spatial interaction the wave 
equation should be generalized as follows: 
݂ሷ(x,t) ൌ	ߙଶ ׬ ݓሺݔ, ߦሻ݂ᇱᇱା௟ି௟ ሺߦ, ݐሻ݀ᆎ							ሺ૚ሻ  
Where ݓሺݔ, ߦሻ	is called a “spatial discount 
function”, it represents the potential of a 
convolution with some variable over the line 
[-l,+l]. Thus, equation 1 is potentialized 
equation. Using the separation variable 
technique, we can rewrite the above 
equation as: 
 ݑሺݔሻݒሺݐሻ ൌ ߙଶݒሺݐሻ ׬ ݓሺݔ, ߦሻݑᇱᇱା௟ି௟ ሺߦሻ݀ߦ  
         (Kaashoek & Paelinck, 1994, p. 585). 
Implying that  
݂ሺݔ, ݐሻ ≜ ݑሺݔሻݒሺݐሻ 
 Let us now take a linear spatial discount 
function over the closed interval [-1, 1],  
ݓሺݔ, ߦሻ ൌ ૚ ൅	૚૛ ሺᆎ െ ࢞ሻ,  ᅔ൏ ݔ.. 
ൌ ૚ ൅	૚૛ ሺ࢞ െ ᆎሻ,  ᅔ ≥ ݔ. 
 
The potential function is  
݌ሺݔሻ ൌ 	න ࢛ᇱᇱሺᆎሻሾ૚ ൅	૚૛ ሺᆎ െ ࢞ሻሿࢊᆎ
࢞
ି૚
൅ න ࢛ᇱᇱሺᆎሻሾ૚
ା૚
࢞
൅	૚૛ ሺ࢞ െ ᆎሻࢊᆎ		 
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Integrating the potential with a factor of 1 
will give us the following 
࢖૚ሺ࢞ሻ ൌ ሾ࢛′ሺ૚ሻ െ ࢛′ሺെ૚ሻሿ 
Integrating with a factor of x gives 
࢖૛ሺ࢞ሻ ൌ െ࢛࢞ᇱሺ࢞ሻ ൅ ૚૛ ሾ࢛
ᇱሺെ૚ሻ െ ࢛ᇱሺ૚ሻሿ࢞ 
Finally, in 
૚
૛ ሺන ࢛
ᇱᇱሺᆎሻᆎࢊᆎ െන ࢛ᇱᇱሺᆎሻᆎࢊᆎሻ	
ା૚
࢞
	
࢞
ି૚
 
The indefinite integral is 
࢛ᇱሺᆎሻᆎ െ ࢛ሺᆎሻ 
By integration by parts and collecting the 
terms we get  
݌ሺݔሻ ൌ ܿ ൅ ܽݔ െ ݑሺݔሻ,	 
With  
ܿ ≜ 	12 ሾݑ
ᇱሺ1ሻ െ ݑᇱሺെ1ሻ ൅ ݑሺ1ሻ ൅ ݑሺെ1ሻሽ 
ܽ ≜ 	12 ሾݑ
ᇱሺ1ሻ െ ݑᇱሺെ1ሻሿ 
The linear potential implies a straight line 
passing through the origin and rotating with 
time (Kaashoek & Paelinck, 1994, p. 587).   
Let us now take an exponential spatial 
discount function 
ݓሺݔ, ᆎሻ ൌ 	૚ࢽ ࢋ࢞࢖ሺെ
|࢞ െ ᆎ|
ࢽ ሻ 
In the above equation, ᆃ is a scaling variable 
and ᆃ > 0. Then the potential function is  
݌ሺݔሻ
ൌ 	૚ࢽ ቊන ࢛
ᇱᇱሺᆎሻࢋ࢞࢖ ൤࢞ െ ᆎࢽ ൨ࢊᆎ
࢞
ି૚
൅ න ࢛ᇱᇱሺᆎሻࢋ࢞࢖ ൤࢞ െ ᆎࢽ ൨ࢊᆎ	
ା૚
࢞
	ቋ 
Refer to Kaashoek and Paelinck (1994) for 
the solution. “The resulting behavior is not 
unlike representing the occupational density 
of a city and its evolution over time” 
(Kaashoek & Paelinck, 1994, p. 588).  
4. The Theoretical Framework for 
the Expansion of Settlements  
In this section, we will use spatial economics 
to describe the speed of the growth of the 
Israeli settlements inside the West Bank and 
Jerusalem over time. We will develop a 
theoretical model that will describe the 
process of the border movement of the 
settlements. Our theoretical model will 
identify the factors that affect the movement 
of the borders. Thus, the theoretical model 
will explain the process of how the 
settlements expand and provide the 
theoretical framework for the evolution of the 
Israeli settlements.   
A vital aspect of spatial economics in general 
is that in principle all relevant variables are 
spatially interrelated. The choice of space-
and-time specifications is manifested 
naturally in a theoretical analysis. PDE 
contains these specifications, they allow the 
demonstrations of movement simultaneously 
over space –whatever is the dimension- and 
time. When solving such equations, the ideal 
solution is a function that contains the values 
of the considered variables in the analysis for 
every point in space and time. 
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We will start our analysis by developing a 
dynamic model for a representative Israeli 
settlement. We will then generalize the model 
to include all the settlements.   
The total land for the region is constant –the 
total area of the West Bank including 
Jerusalem.  The center of the system is in the 
center of the Israeli settlement and the system 
is symmetric.  The Israeli settlement is 
located in the center and the Palestinian areas 
are surrounding the settlement. The Israeli 
settlement is causing the “swallowing of the 
Palestinian lands”.  The dynamics of the 
system are spatial and temporal movements 
of the following variables: 
I(x,t) is the land prices in the Israeli 
settlement’ areas at (x,t) 
P(x,t) is the land prices at the 
Palestinian areas at (x,t) 
B(t) is the distance from the center of 
the Israeli settlement to the 
boundaries that separate the 
Palestinians from the Israeli areas.  
Where P, B, and I belong to the set of real 
number.1 
The equilibrium land prices for both Israel 
and Palestine are determined using the supply 
and demand for land in the Israeli and 
Palestinian markets respectively over time 
and space dimensions. In other words, 
equilibrium land prices are determined by the 
forces of supply and demand for the two 
distinct markets.  However, the actual land 
prices are not only dependent on the classical 
economic theory of supply and demand.  
Actual prices are also dependent on political 
                                                            
 
factors such as the majority in the Knesset, 
the tradeoff between political turmoil and 
regional stability adopted by policy makers in 
the region, and political pressures from the 
outside.  Thus, it is important for us to 
consider the difference between the actual 
land prices and the equilibrium land prices 
for both Israeli and Palestine.   
Here I and P represent the deviations of the 
actual land prices from the long-run 
equilibrium land prices.  Let us express the 
long-run equilibrium determined on the basis 
of the new urban economics as (i*(x), p*(x)) 
which is independent of time, and the actual 
regional pattern by (i(x,t), p(x,t)), then we 
will have the following 
ܫሺݔ, ݐሻ ൌ ݅ሺݔ, ݐሻ െ ݅∗ሺݔሻ 
ܲሺݔ, ݐሻ ൌ ݌ሺݔ, ݐሻ െ ݌∗ሺݔሻ 
Thus, when we talk about land prices, we 
mean the deviations of the actual land prices 
from the equilibrium.   
Assume that a positive excess supply is 
associated by positive prices and vice versa.  
In addition, there are other exogenous forces 
that will cause the deviation in the Palestinian 
prices of land from their equilibrium. In this 
study we are interested in the speed of the 
movement of the boundaries. Since we 
assume that the Israeli settlements should not 
exist so over the long-run the Israeli 
settlements would not exist and the entire 
West Bank including Jerusalem should be 
free from settlements. However, as 
mentioned before we are only interested and 
focused on the situation at the boundaries. 
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We assume that the speed of the movement 
of the boundary –dB(t)/dt- is negatively 
proportional to the gradient of the Palestinian 
land prices at the boundary. That is when the 
Palestinian land prices decrease the Israeli 
settlement boundaries will be tempted to 
expand at a fast rate.  Meanwhile, if the prices 
are high the boundary will move at a slow 
rate.  Usually, in the Palestinian areas the 
high prices of the Palestinian lands are 
associated with a high density of the 
Palestinians and as a result the boundaries of 
the settlement will not be tempted to move 
forward.  In other words, the boundary will 
move at a very slow pace. The movement of 
the Israeli settlement boundary is positively 
proportional to the Israeli land prices in the 
settlement. A high land price at the settlement 
is usually associated with a high demand to 
live in that settlement and as a result, the 
boundary is pressured to expand. 
Consider the location B(t)-δx in the Israeli 
settlements where δx is positive and 
sufficiently small. The gradient of the Israeli 
land prices near the boundary is represented 
as follows 
ሼܫሺܤሺݐሻ െ 0, ݐሻ െ ܫሺܤሺݐሻ െ ߜݔ, ݐሻ/ߜݔ 
The above equation represents the Israeli 
settlement price per mile between the 
boundary and its neighborhood. The value is 
usually negative, so we consider the absolute 
value. The larger the absolute value the more 
easily the boundary is moved. 
Let us now consider the Palestinian land 
prices near the boundary represented by 
B(t)+δy, where δy is positive and sufficiently 
small. The gradient of the Palestinian land 
prices near the boundary is  
ሼܲሺܤሺݐሻ ൅ ߜݕሻ, ݐሻ െ ܲሺܤሺݐሻ ൅ 0, ݐሻሽ/ߜݕ  , 
The speed of the movement of the boundary 
is given by  
ௗ஻ሺ௧ሻ
ௗ௧ ൌ 	݄ሼܫሺܤሺݐሻ െ ߜݔ, ݐሻሽ/δx-
kP{B(t)+δy,t)-P(B(t)+0,t)}/δy 
In the above equation, h and k are non-
negative parameters. We will now allow for 
δx and δy to go to 0, then we can rewrite the 
above equation as:  
ௗ஻ሺ௧ሻ
ௗ௧ ൌ ሼ݄
డூ
డ௫ െ ݇
డ௉
డ௫ሽ    x=B(t) 
This equation describes the movement of the 
boundary. This is known as the Stefan 
condition (Zhang, 1988, p. 335). The above 
equation represents the expansion of the 
representative Israeli settlement and thus we 
obtain the “swallowing” rate of the 
Palestinian lands by the representative Israeli 
settlement.  Looking at the above equation, it 
is clear that the difference in land prices in the 
Israeli settlements and the Palestinian 
territories affects the expansion rate of the 
border. Given that the land prices in the 
Israeli settlement are higher than the land 
prices in the Palestinian territories, the 
greater is the difference the faster is the 
expansion rate of the border. Thus, the land 
prices along the two sides of Israeli 
settlement border are crucial to the rate of 
expansion. 
Since the difference in prices is not the only 
factor that causes the expansion of the 
settlement, we will add the variable u(x,t) to 
represent the additional rate of expansion due 
to the political decision of the Israeli 
government that is not captured by land 
prices. The Israeli government’s strategy is 
52                                WISAM A. SAMARAH AND MOHAMMAD A. TALALWEH 
geopolitical, where its sole propose is to 
create a major in balanced favoring the Israeli 
population in the West Bank. Hence, we will 
have the following equation 
ௗ஻ሺ௧ሻ
ௗ௧ ൌ ሼ݄
డூ
డ௫ െ ݇
డ௉
డ௫ሽ + u(x, t)   x=B(t), 
where u belong to the set of real numbers. 
Here u is an exogenous variable, i.e. it is 
determined by factors outside the model. 
Nonetheless, there is not only one settlement 
in the occupied Palestinian territories. 
Therefore, we need to expand our model to 
include the n number of Israeli settlements 
and thus estimate the aggregate expansion 
rate for all the Israeli settlements as given 
below: 
∑ ࢊ࡮࢏ሺ࢚ሻࢊ࢚࢔࢏ୀ૚         Where n is a positive integer 
greater than 0 
The above equation describes the rate of 
expansion of the borders for all the Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank including 
Jerusalem. Clearly, the equation will result in 
a finite number and the rate of expansion is 
limited to the actual total area of the West 
Bank that is under the control of the Israeli 
government. Only in these areas can the 
settlements grow. The areas controlled by the 
Palestinian government –known as area A- 
are protected against the expansion of the 
Israeli settlements.    
Notably, the rate of expansion for each 
settlement is different depending on the 
difference between the Israeli and Palestinian 
land prices along the borders of the 
settlement. Unlike normal economic 
transactions, the leakage of Palestinian land 
to the Israeli government’s ownership is a 
shady deal. The Palestinians are usually 
subjected to identity theft Israeli institutions 
and the transaction is carried out on their 
behalf. Nonetheless, if this does not work 
other ways are adapted by the Israeli 
government in order to carry out the 
transaction.  Finally, if all fails the Israeli 
authorities uses force and confiscate the land. 
In all cases, Israelis are willing to compensate 
the Palestinians if they agree to sell land. The 
price they offer is usually dependent on the 
Palestinian price of land. The higher the 
Palestinian price the higher is the Israeli price 
and the harder it is for the Israelis to give an 
offer.  At the end of the day, the Israelis best 
interest is to show that they bought the land 
rather than taking it by force. 
5. Data and Methodology 
The data for the initial area and the area in 
2016 for each of the settlement was taken 
from the Wafa organization website.  
Meanwhile, the establishment date and 
number of settlers inhabiting the settlement 
was taken from the B’tselem website.  
With the aim of trying to estimate a 
functional equation for the expansion rate of 
the Israeli settlements, we will calculate the 
cumulative sum for the initial areas of the 
settlements.  The cumulative sums are then 
plotted against time (t). We will then fit a 
model to estimate the “swallowing” rate of 
the Palestinian lands. 
6. Results 
The Excel program was used to analyze the 
data. Where the results of the analysis are 
given below.  
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Table 3: Total Growth. Years Passed, Growth Rate and Cumulative Sum for each of the 
Israeli Settlements 
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Kfar Etzion 1967 258 567 1099 1.197674419 49 1.61991889 258 
Mehola 1968 241 288 517 0.195020747 48 0.37186376 499 
Qalya 1968 271 771 386 1.84501845 48 2.2021674 770 
Argaman 1968 109 353 131 2.23853211 48 2.4783807 879 
Rosh Tzurim 1969 247 463 934 0.874493927 47 1.34586723 1126 
Alon Shvut 1970 492 463 3180 -0.058943089 46 -0.1319817 1618 
Mevo Horon 1970 603 524 2566 -0.131011609 46 -0.3048074 2221 
Ma’ale Efrayim 1970 359 489 1209 0.362116992 46 0.67408812 2580 
Yitav 1970 117 322 321 1.752136752 46 2.2252176 2697 
Gilgal 1970 181 727 178 3.016574586 46 3.06881924 2878 
Massu’a 1970 162 692 162 3.271604938 46 3.20684493 3040 
Mizpe Shalem 1971 72 108 174 0.5 45 0.9051051 3112 
Hamra 1971 123 261 124 1.12195122 45 1.68591165 3235 
Kiryat Arba 1972 466 787 7272 0.688841202 44 1.19812666 3701 
Har Gilo 1972 224 507 1570 1.263392857 44 1.87385157 3925 
Beka’ot 1972 115 344 187 1.991304348 44 2.52151462 4040 
Gittit 1973     430 #DIV/0! 43 #DIV/0! 4040 
Mechora 1973 103 171 142 0.660194175 43 1.18589422 4143 
Ma’ale Adumim 1975 3291 7010 37670 1.130051656 41 1.86137059 7434 
Ofra 1975     3605 #DIV/0! 41 #DIV/0! 7434 
Elazar 1975 265 349 2568 0.316981132 41 0.67382615 7699 
Petza’el 1975 319 897 257 1.811912226 41 2.55368316 8018 
Netiv Hagedud 1976 234 1425 190 5.08974359 40 4.62006251 8252 
Ro’i 1976 106 164 165 0.547169811 40 1.09704219 8358 
Beit El 1977 688 557 6115 -0.190406977 39 -0.540135 9046 
Kedumim 1977     4323 #DIV/0! 39 #DIV/0! 9046 
Elkana 1977 867 1757 3898 1.026528258 39 1.82758711 9913 
Tekoa 1977 527 844 3633 0.601518027 39 1.21488965 10440 
Kochav Hashachar 1977 301 1033 1985 2.431893688 39 3.2123429 10741 
Neve Halamish 1977 297 2510 1328 7.451178451 39 5.62509426 11038 
Bet Horon 1977 235 199 1240 -0.153191489 39 -0.4254531 11273 
Shvei Shomron 1977 276 391 897 0.416666667 39 0.89709407 11549 
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Sal’it 1977 443 691 818 0.559819413 39 1.1464451 11992 
Rimmonim 1977     625 #DIV/0! 39 #DIV/0! 11992 
Migdal Oz 1977 95 464 605 3.884210526 39 4.1505084 12087 
Rehan 1977 86 298 224 2.465116279 39 3.23784211 12173 
Almog 1977 107 397 239 2.710280374 39 3.41896153 12280 
Niran 1977 107 397 91 2.710280374 39 3.41896153 12387 
Ari’el 1978 2378 4729 19220 0.988645921 38 1.82555253 14765 
Karnei Shomron 1978 341 631 7102 0.850439883 38 1.63272078 15106 
Mitzpe Yeriho 1978 331 747 2319 1.256797583 38 2.16507004 15437 
Kfar Tapuah 1978 181 396 1071 1.187845304 38 2.08167924 15618 
Mevo Dotan 1978 96 768 386 7 38 5.62470912 15714 
Tomer 1978 218 366 262 0.678899083 38 1.37286012 15932 
Kfar Adumim 1979 412 693 4271 0.682038835 37 1.41534588 16344 
Shilo 1979 387 3247 3727 7.390180879 37 5.91727345 16731 
Elon Moreh 1979 381 1047 1861 1.748031496 37 2.76978584 17112 
Shademot Mehola 1979 164 363 608 1.213414634 37 2.17061816 17276 
Efrat 1980 992 1792 8658 0.806451613 36 1.65624528 18268 
Givon Hahadasha 1980     1135 #DIV/0! 36 #DIV/0! 18268 
Ma’ale Shomeron 1980     1037 #DIV/0! 36 #DIV/0! 18268 
Vered Yeriho 1980     252 #DIV/0! 36 #DIV/0! 18268 
Hemdat 1980 75 202 230 1.693333333 36 2.79038742 18343 
Beit Ha’arava 1980 75 163 183 1.173333333 36 2.17969937 18418 
Yafit 1980 173 297 139 0.716763006 36 1.5125487 18591 
Bet Arye 1981 837 7814 4842 8.33572282 35 6.59050329 19428 
Psagot 1981     1847 #DIV/0! 35 #DIV/0! 19428 
Yaqir 1981 3016 574 1901 -0.809681698 35 -4.6295723 22444 
Barkan 1981 411 563 1798 0.369829684 35 0.90315812 22855 
Nili 1981 321 1296 1552 3.037383178 35 4.06798411 23176 
Ma’ale Mikhmas 1981 221 1507 1323 5.819004525 35 5.63810437 23397 
Hinnanit 1981 163 698 1164 3.282208589 35 4.24318015 23560 
Ateret 1981 160 3393 875 20.20625 35 9.11864588 23720 
Shaqed 1981 229 463 864 1.021834061 35 2.03180884 23949 
Einav 1981 183 466 749 1.546448087 35 2.70654924 24132 
Mattityahu 1981 149 755 772 4.067114094 35 4.74565564 24281 
Ma’on 1981 167 443 539 1.652694611 35 2.82657022 24448 
Carmel 1981 182 347 605 0.906593407 35 1.86086829 24630 
Ma’ale Amos 1981 89 310 390 2.483146067 35 3.62985855 24719 
Neve Daniel 1982 268 457 2278 0.705223881 34 1.58207976 24987 
Nokdim 1982 231 336 2052 0.454545455 34 1.10813438 25218 
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Alei Zahav 1982 339 608 1643 0.793510324 34 1.73300639 25557 
Almon  1982 194 689 1329 2.551546392 34 3.79794365 25751 
Eshkolot 1982 92 139 515 0.510869565 34 1.22117667 25843 
Pnei Hever 1982 98 522 548 4.326530612 34 5.04273297 25941 
Telem 1982 95 451 362 3.747368421 34 4.6877039 26036 
Hermesh 1982 96 445 223 3.635416667 34 4.61425013 26132 
Naama 1982 119 280 116 1.352941176 34 2.54860038 26251 
Giv’at Ze’ev 1983 1257 2741 16865 1.180588703 33 2.39053467 27508 
Sha’arei Tikva 1983     5811 #DIV/0! 33 #DIV/0! 27508 
Immanuel 1983 301 740 3309 1.458471761 33 2.76337051 27809 
Har Bracha 1983 238 350 2339 0.470588235 33 1.17552986 28047 
Yitzhar 1983 200 1248 1468 5.24 33 5.70523662 28247 
Dolev 1983 280 1186 1331 3.235714286 33 4.47148729 28527 
Susiya 1983 268 460 1115 0.71641791 33 1.65056316 28795 
Otniel 1983 301 740 976 1.458471761 33 2.76337051 29096 
Kiryat Netafim 1983 141 339 910 1.404255319 33 2.69395176 29237 
Ma’ale Levona 1983 161 503 826 2.124223602 33 3.51235401 29398 
Tene   1983 185 390 768 1.108108108 33 2.28570332 29583 
Asefar 1983 86 201 688 1.337209302 33 2.60597575 29669 
Mezadot Yehuda 1983 208 429 466 1.0625 33 2.21793182 29877 
Migdalim 1983 66 136 305 1.060606061 33 2.21508619 29943 
Maskiyyot 1983 45 413 253 8.177777778 33 6.94829487 29988 
Rotem 1983 44 55 196 0.25 33 0.67848392 30032 
Avenat 1983 43 89 193 1.069767442 33 2.22882764 30075 
Adam(Geva 
Binyamin) 
1984 457 1324 5278 1.897155361 32 3.38002153 30532 
Eli 1984 591 2167 4233 2.666666667 32 4.14381488 31123 
Pedu’el 1984     1682 #DIV/0! 32 #DIV/0! 31123 
Itamar 1984 182 677 1151 2.71978022 32 4.19063023 31305 
Carmei Tzur 1984 135 397 1047 1.940740741 32 3.428273 31440 
Nahaliel 1984 90 1585 639 16.61111111 32 9.37821614 31530 
Beit Hagai 1984 142 869 573 5.11971831 32 5.82428851 31672 
Adora 1984 182 372 421 1.043956044 32 2.25916355 31854 
Beitar Illit 1985 2208 3632 51636 0.644927536 31 1.61842899 34062 
Oranit 1985     8652 #DIV/0! 31 #DIV/0! 34062 
Kochav Ya’akov 1985 564 2311 7394 3.09751773 31 4.65469993 34626 
Hasmoneam 1985 752 501 2826 -0.333776596 31 -1.3015531 35378 
Etz Efrayim 1985 233 344 2022 0.47639485 31 1.26471525 35611 
Qedar 1985 241 365 1555 0.514522822 31 1.34803882 35852 
Shim’a 1985 113 172 592 0.522123894 31 1.36440699 35965 
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Har Adar 1986 1257 2741 3980 1.180588703 30 2.63270891 37222 
Nofim 1987 215 632 690 1.939534884 29 3.7880945 37437 
Na’ale 1988 314 1105 1661 2.51910828 28 4.59609024 37751 
Talmon 1989     3879 #DIV/0! 27 #DIV/0! 37751 
Zufin(Zufim) 1989     2087 #DIV/0! 27 #DIV/0! 37751 
Bat Ayin 1989 291 417 1307 0.432989691 27 1.34137213 38042 
Avne Hefetz 1990 269 789 1759 1.933085502 26 4.22550974 38311 
Revava 1991 240 605 2181 1.520833333 25 3.76759835 38551 
Rechelim 1991 67 217 668 2.23880597 25 4.81305926 38618 
Alfei Menashe 1993     7780 #DIV/0! 23 #DIV/0! 38618 
Modi’in Ilit 1996 2103 4549 66847 1.163100333 20 3.93308853 40721 
Kfar 
Haoranim(Menora) 
1998 337 1329 2678 2.943620178 18 7.92083136 41058 
Bruchin 1999     818 #DIV/0! 17 #DIV/0! 41058 
Sansana 1999 74 188 377 1.540540541 17 5.63776011 41132 
Negohot 1999 53 227 289 3.283018868 17 8.93357685 41185 
Gilad Farm 2002       #DIV/0! 14 #DIV/0! 41185 
 
Table 4: Cumulative Sum for the Settlements and the Gompertz Model Coefficients 
 
 Cumulative  
sum 
 a b c 
  16 28 0.28 
1967 258 0 1.11E-11       
1968 879 1 1.03E-08       
1969 1126 2 1.81E-06       
1970 3040 3 9E-05       
1971 3235 4 0.001724 Gompertz model 
1972 4040 5 0.016049  f(t)=a*(exp(-b*exp(-ct))) 
1973 4143 6 0.08665 
1975 8018 8 0.812004 
1976 8358 9 1.681556 
1977 12387 10 2.915108 
1978 15932 11 4.418187 
1979 17276 12 6.049656 
1980 18591 13 7.671584 
1981 24719 14 9.1801 
1982 26251 15 10.51405 
1983 30075 16 11.64938 
1984 31854 17 12.5881 
1985 35965 18 13.34743 
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1986 37222 19 13.95156 
1987 37437 20 14.42624 
1988 37751 21 14.79567 
1989 38042 22 15.08115 
1990 38311 23 15.30056 
1991 38618 24 15.4685 
1993 38618 26 15.6942 
1996 40721 29 15.86726 
1998 41058 31 15.92404 
1999 41185 32 15.94256 
2002 41185 35 15.97518 
 
Graph 2: Gompertz Model Function 
 
 
 
7. Discussion 
Looking at the above results we notice that 
the growth rate for each settlement vary from 
-0.81 to 9.38. However, the “Swallowing” 
rate of the Palestinian lands by the expansion 
of the Israeli settlements follows the 
Gompertz function. This is a time series 
mathematical model that uses a log 
exponential approximation to describe the 
growth rate. This rate follows an “S” shape 
where it is slowest at the beginning and at the 
end of a given time period. 
Looking at the graph in table 4, we notice that 
there was a slow growth rate in the initial 
areas occupied by the Israeli settlements from 
the year 1967 to 1973.  In 1967, the Israeli 
forces had succeeded in occupying the West 
Bank including East Jerusalem.  Immediately 
after the occupation, the Israeli government 
quickly began “swallowing” East Jerusalem 
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by building settlements. Nonetheless, the rest 
of the West Bank was not invested in.  From 
1973 to 1984, the Israeli government moved 
forward with its plans to “swallow” the rest 
of the West Bank. This is reflected in our 
graph by the increase in the growth rate 
where the slope –rate of change- of the graoh 
is increasing at an increasing rate. Finally, 
from the year 1984 to 2002, the growth rate 
in the number of settlements had started to 
increase at a decreasing rate. Thus, the Israeli 
government had continued with its 
“swallowing” by the building of new 
settlements but at a much slower pace.  
Did the story end here? Unfortunately, not; 
we now move to our theoretical dynamic 
model to explain the rate of expansion of each 
of the existing settlements shown in table 3 
under total growth and growth rate. In table 
3, we calculated both the total growth and the 
growth rate for each settlement. However, the 
lack of data on the prices of land along, the 
borders of the settlements makes it hard to 
predict the expansion rate for each 
settlement. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper developed a dynamic theoretical 
model to explain the process by which the 
existing Israeli settlements are expanding and 
thus developing an equation to explain the 
“swallowing” rate of the Palestinian lands. It 
described a pattern in which the Israeli 
settlements are far away from their 
equilibrium – where the West Bank including 
Jerusalem should have zero settlements. The 
paper also derived an empirical mathematical 
time series model that can somewhat estimate 
the rate of growth of Israeli settlements, 
which will in turn provide policy makers with 
a better prediction of the “swallowing” of 
Palestinian lands. 
The theoretical dynamic model outlined by 
this paper described the expansion of Israeli 
settlements. The resulting model had asserted 
that the rate of expansion of the settlements is 
dependent on the difference in land prices 
between the Israeli settlements and 
Palestinian territories and the benchmark set 
by the Israeli government. 
So, are the Palestinians fully aware of the 
threats from the settlements? The answer is 
“yes”, however the Israeli government had 
succeeded in creating Palestinian 
dependency on the Israeli economy (Samarah 
and Rahman, 2017). This is turn would deter 
the efforts of Palestinians from slowing down 
the ‘swallowing’ of their lands. 
What can the Palestinians do to slow down 
the “swallowing”?  One way to prevent the 
expansion of the settlements by the 
Palestinian government is to constantly 
inflate Palestinian land prices along the 
borders of the settlements.  The increase in 
prices minimizes the price difference 
between Palestinian and Israeli land. This can 
be done by providing both financial and 
logistical support for Palestinians who either 
live or own land along the borders. In 
addition, it will relieve Palestinians of the 
potential Israeli pressure inserted to sell their 
lands; and finally, it will limit the indirect 
ways that Israelis use to trick Palestinians 
into selling their land. 
Over the long run as the Palestinian 
population grows, the demand curve for 
Palestinian land shifts to the right – given the 
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constant supply of land, which is represented 
by a vertical line – the equilibrium land price, 
will increase. Thus, it is important for the 
Palestinian government to provide all the 
necessary aid in order to strengthen the 
steadfastness or Palestinians on their lands. 
The ambition of this paper is to open the way 
for more empirical studies to be conducted 
based on our theoretical framework and the 
empirical model.  In addition, understanding 
the patterns of the increase in Israeli settlers 
and the pace of the settlement expansion will 
aid policymakers in attempting to limit their 
growth. Furthermore, policymakers can 
include the rate of expansion of settlements 
in their strategic plans and better plan 
Palestinian urban and rural development.  
Finally, with such predictions, policymakers 
can also try to minimize the negative effects 
of settlements as much as possible. 
 
Annex I 
Table 2: The Name of the Settlement, the Date of Establishment, the Initial Area Occupied 
by the Settlement when Established, and the Area Occupied in 2016. 
 Name of Settlement Date of 
Establishment 
Initial 
Area (m2) 
Area in 
2016 (m2) 
Number of 
Settlers in 2016 
1 Modi’in Ilit 1996 2103 4549 66847 
2 Beitar Illit 1985 2208 3632 51636 
3 Ma’ale Adumim 1975 3291 7010 37670 
4 Ari’el 1978 2378 4729 19220 
5 Giv’at Ze’ev 1983 1257 2741 16865 
6 Oranit 1985   8652 
7 Efrat 1980 992 1792 8658 
8 Alfei Menashe 1993   7780 
9 Kochav Ya’akov 1985 564 2311 7394 
10 Kiryat Arba 1972 466 787 7272 
11 Karnei Shomron 1978 341 631 7102 
12 Beit El 1977 688 557 6115 
13 Sha’arei Tikva 1983   5811 
14 Adam (Geva 
Binyamin) 
1984 457 1324 5278 
15 Bet Arye 1981 837 7814 4842 
16 Kedumim 1977   4323 
17 Kfar Adumim 1979 412 693 4271 
18 Eli 1984 591 2167 4233 
19 Elkana 1977 867 1757 3898 
20 Har Adar 1986 1257 2741 3980 
21 Talmon  1989   3879 
22 Tekoa 1977 527 844 3633 
23 Shilo 1979 387 3247 3727 
24 Immanuel  1983 301 740 3309 
25 Alon Shvut 1970 492 463 3180 
26 Ofra 1975   3605 
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27 Hasmoneam 1985 752 501 2826 
28 Kfar 
Haoranim(Menora) 
1998 337 1329 2678 
29 Elazar 1975 265 349 2568 
30 Mevo Horon  1970 603 524 2566 
31 Mitzpe Yeriho  1978 331 747 2319 
32 Neve Daniel  1982 268 457 2278 
33 Har Bracha  1983 238 350 2339 
34 Zufin (Zufim)  1989   2087 
35 Revava 1991 240 605 2181 
36 Kochav Hashachar 1977 301 1033 1985 
37 Nokdim 1982 231 336 2052 
38 Psagot 1981   1847 
39 Yaqir  1981 3016 574 1901 
40 Etz Efrayim 1985 233 344 2022 
41 Elon Moreh  1979 381 1047 1861 
42 Barkan 1981 411 563 1798 
43 Avne Hefetz  1990 269 789 1759 
44 Pedu’el 1984   1682 
45 Na’ale  1988 314 1105 1661 
46 Har Gilo  1972 224 507 1570 
47 Qedar  1985 241 365 1555 
48 Nili 1981 321 1296 1552 
49 Yitzhar 1983 200 1248 1468 
50 Ma’ale Mikhmas  1981 221 1507 1323 
51 Itamar  1984 182 677 1151 
52 Dolev  1983 280 1186 1331 
53 Alei Zahav  1982 339 608 1643 
54 Almon   1982 194 689 1329 
55 Neve Halamish 1977 297 2510 1328 
56 Bet Horon  1977 235 199 1240 
57 Bat Ayin  1989 291 417 1307 
58 Ma’ale Efrayim  1970 359 489 1209 
59 Givon Hahadasha 1980   1135 
60 Hinnanit 1981 163 698 1164 
61 Kfar Etzion  1967 258 567 1099 
62 Susiya  1983 268 460 1115 
63 Carmei Tzur  1984 135 397 1047 
64 Ma’ale Shomeron  1980   1037 
65 Kfar Tapuah  1978 181 396 1071 
66 Rosh Tzurim  1969 247 463 934 
67 Otniel 1983 301 740 976 
68 Ateret  1981 160 3393 875 
69 Shvei Shomron  1977 276 391 897 
70 Kiryat Netafim  1983 141 339 910 
71 Shaqed  1981 229 463 864 
72 Ma’ale Levona  1983 161 503 826 
73 Tene    1983 185 390 768 
74 Bruchin  1999   818 
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75 Einav  1981 183 466 749 
76 Mattityahu  1981 149 755 772 
77 Sal’it  1977 443 691 818 
78 Nahaliel 1984 90 1585 639 
79 Nofim  1987 215 632 690 
80 Rimmonim 1977   625 
81 Beit Hagai 1984 142 869 573 
82 Asefar  1983 86 201 688 
83 Rechelim 1991 67 217 668 
84 Shademot Mehola  1979 164 363 608 
85 Shim’a 1985 113 172 592 
86 Ma’on  1981 167 443 539 
87 Eshkolot  1982 92 139 515 
88 Mehola  1968 241 288 517 
89 Mezadot Yehuda 1983 208 429 466 
90 Migdal Oz  1977 95 464 605 
91 Pnei Hever  1982 98 522 548 
92 Carmel  1981 182 347 605 
93 Adora  1984 182 372 421 
94 Qalya  1968 271 771 386 
95 Ma’ale Amos  1981 89 310 390 
96 Gittit 1973   430 
97 Mevo Dotan  1978 96 768 386 
98 Telem  1982 95 451 362 
99 Sansana  1999 74 188 377 
100 Negohot 1999 53 227 289 
101 Yitav 1970 117 322 321 
102 Migdalim 1983 66 136 305 
103 Petza’el  1975 319 897 257 
104 Tomer 1978 218 366 262 
105 Vered Yeriho  1980   252 
106 Gilad Farm  2002    
107 Hemdat  1980 75 202 230 
108 Hermesh  1982 96 445 223 
109 Rehan  1977 86 298 224 
110 Almog 1977 107 397 239 
111 Maskiyyot 1983 45 413 253 
112 Beka’ot 1972 115 344 187 
113 Netiv Hagedud 1976 234 1425 190 
114 Mizpe Shalem  1971 72 108 174 
115 Gilgal  1970 181 727 178 
116 Rotem  1983 44 55 196 
117 Ro’i 1976 106 164 165 
118 Beit Ha’arava  1980 75 163 183 
119 Yafit  1980 173 297 139 
120 Massu’a  1970 162 692 162 
121 Mechora  1973 103 171 142 
122 Argaman  1968 109 353 131 
123 Avenat  1983 43 89 193 
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124 Hamra  1971 123 261 124 
125 Naama  1982 119 280 116 
126 Niran  1977 107 397 91 
 
Source:  The names of the settlements date of establishment, and number of settlers were taken 
from B‘t Selem.  The initial area and area in 2016 were taken from Wafa organization.  
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